Characterizations of the Egalitarian Solution for Convex Games by Klijn, F. et al.
Characterizations of the Egalitarian
Solution for Convex Games1
FLIP KLIJN2,M ARCO SLIKKER, AND STEF TIJS
Department of Econometrics and CentER, Tilburg University,P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg,
The Netherlands.
JOS´ E ZARZUELO
Department of Applied Mathematics, Universityof Pais Vasco, 48015 Bilbao, Spain.
Abstract: The egalitarian solution for TU-games as introduced by Dutta and Ray [3] is s-
tudied. Two characterizations of the restriction of this solution to the class of convex games
are given, using weak variants of the reduced game properties of Hart and Mas-Colell [6] and
Davis and Maschler [5]. The other properties are a stability property, inspired by Selten [8],
and a property restricting maximum payoffs. Further, a dual egalitarian solution is introduced
and it is proved that for a convex game the egalitarian allocation is equal to the dual egalitarian
allocation for its dual concave game.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Number: C71
Keywords: convex TU-games, egalitarian solution, characterizations
1 Introduction
Dutta and Ray [3] introduced the egalitarian solution as a solution concept for TU-games. This
solution uniﬁes the two conﬂicting concepts of individualistic utility maximization and the
social goal of equality. Under certain conditionsit isnon-empty,and then its outcomeis unique,
namely it is the Lorenz maximal element of the set of payoffs satisfying core-like participation
constraints. We refer to Dutta and Ray [3] for the details. For convex games Dutta and Ray [3]
describe an algorithm to locate the unique egalitarian solution, and they show, in addition, that
it is in the core. Dutta [2] characterizes the egalitarian solution over the class of convex games.
Dutta and Ray [4] consider a parallel concept, the S-constrained egalitarian solution. Arin and
I˜ narra [1] introduce a solution concept that coincides with the egalitarian solution for 2-person
games. This solution concept is called the egalitarian set.
Dutta [2] characterized the egalitarian solution over the class of convex games. The main
properties used are the reduced game properties due to Hart and Mas-Colell [6] and Davis and
Maschler [5]. The egalitarian solution is the only solution concept satisfying either of the two
reduced game properties and a prescriptive property on two person games.
1The authors thank Herbert Hamers for useful suggestions and comments.
2Correspondingauthor. E-mail: F.Klijn@kub.nl.
1Here we provide two other characterizations. Both characterizations involve a stability
property due to the concept of the equal division core from Selten [8] and a property restricting
maximumpayoffs. Theﬁrstcharacterizationinvolvesinadditionaweakervariantofthereduced
game property of Hart and Mas-Colell [6], whereas the second characterization is obtained by
making use of a weaker variant of the reduced game property of Davis and Maschler [5].
Further, a dual egalitarian solutionis deﬁned on the class of concave TU-games. It turns out
that for a convex game the egalitarian allocation is equal to the dual egalitarianallocation for its
dual (concave) game. Similar results hold for the Shapley value [9], the Prenucleolus [7], and
the -value [10].
The work is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with notation and deﬁnitions regarding
TU-games. Section3recallstheegalitariansolutionforconvexgames. Twocharacterizationsof
this solution concept are presented. Finally,in section 4 a dual egalitarian solution is introduced
and a duality result is proved.
2 Preliminaries
Acooperativegamewithtransferableutilities(TU-game)isapair(N;v),whereN =f1;:::;ng
is the player set and v the characteristic function, which assigns to every subset3 S of N av a l u e
v( S) , with v(;)=0 .Ag a m e( N;v) is called convex if
v(S [ T)+v( S\T)v( S)+v( T) for all S;T  N;
and concave if
v(S [ T)+v( S\T)v( S)+v( T) for all S;T  N:
The core of a game (N;v) is deﬁned by
C(N;v): =f x2IR
N : x ( N )=v ( N) ;and x(S)  v(S) for all S  Ng;
and its dual core is deﬁned by
C
(N;v): =f x2IR
N : x ( N )=v ( N) ;and x(S)  v(S) for all S  Ng:
The dual game of (N;v) is the game (N;v),g i v e nb y
v
( S): =v ( N)−v ( Nn S )for all S  N:
It is easily shown that C(N;v)=C ( N;v).
Throughout this paper we will denote the average worth of coalition S in game (N;v) by
a(S;v): =
v ( S )
j S j
:
3SNdenotes that S is a subset of N and S  N denotes that S is a strict subset of N.
23 Convex games and the egalitarian solution
Inthissectionwe willprovidetwologicallyindependentcharacterizationsoftheegalitarianrule
for convex games. To this end, let us ﬁrst recall the algorithm of Dutta and Ray [3]. In every
step of the algorithm a cooperative game is considered. The set of players in this game is the
set of players that have not received a payoff yet. The largest coalition with the highest average
worth is selected and the players in this coalition receive this average worth.
Let (N;v) be a convex TU-game. Deﬁne N1 := N and v1 := v.
STEP 1: Let S1 be the largest coalition with the highest average worth in the game (N1;v 1).
Deﬁne
Ei(N;v): =a ( S 1;v 1) for all i 2 S1:
STEP k: Suppose that S1;:::;S k−1 have been deﬁned recursively and S1 [[S k−1 6=N.
Deﬁne a new game with player set Nk := Nk−1nSk−1 = Nn(S1 [[S k−1). For all
subcoalitions S  Nk,d e ﬁ n ev k ( S ): =v k − 1 ( S k − 1[S )−v k − 1 ( S k − 1 ) . Convexity of
(Nk−1;v k−1)implies convexity of (Nk;v k).D e ﬁ n eS kto be the largest coalition with the
highest average worth in this game. Deﬁne
Ei(N;v): =a ( S k;v k) for all i 2 Sk:
It can be checked that in every step convexity ensures the existence of a largest coaliton with
highest average worth. In at most n steps the algorithm ends, and the constructed allocation
E(N;v) is called the egalitarian solution of the game (N;v). Dutta and Ray [3] show that
E(N;v) is an element of the core of (N;v). Furthermore, they note that for each convex game
(N;v) it holds that
Ei(N;v) >E j( N;v); for all i 2 Sk;j2S k +1: (1)
Our ﬁrst characterization of the egalitarian solution for convex TU-games involves the
propertiesequaldivisionstability,boundedmaximumpayoffproperty,andHMmax-consistency.
We describe these properties below. Let C be the set of convex TU-games. A solution on C is
am a p assigning to each convex game (N;v) 2Can element  (N;v) 2 IR
N .L e t( N;v) be
a convex game. Given the solution  ,d e ﬁ n eS m( N;v; ) (or Sm for short, if no confusion is
possible) to be the set of players with the highest payoff. Formally,
S
m = S
m(N;v; ): =a r g m a x
j 2 N
  j( N;v):
A solution   on C satiﬁes
 equal division stability(EDS) ifforall games(N;v) 2Cand all S  N thereexistsi 2 S
with
 i(N;v)  a(S;v):
3 bounded maximum payoff property (BMPP) if for all games (N;v) 2C :
X
i 2 S m
  i( N;v)  v(Sm):
 HM max-consistency (HMMC) if for all games (N;v) 2C , and all i 2 NnSm:




where v−Sm is the reduced subgame4 deﬁned by
v
−Sm
(T): =v ( S
m[T)−
X
i 2 S m
  i( S
m[T;v)
for all subcoalitions T  NnSm.
(EDS) plays a role in the concept of equal division core from Selten [8]. (BMPP) states that
the payoffs of the players receiving most is bounded, which might be desirable from a social
point of view. (HMMC) is a weaker variant of the consistency property of Hart and Mas-Colell
[6]. The followinglemma shows that (EDS) and (BMPP) together implyan efﬁciency property.
Lemma 3.1 If a solution   satisﬁes (EDS) and (BMPP) then for all (N;v) 2C
X
i 2 S m
  i( N;v)=v ( S
m) : (2)
Proof. Let   be a solution that satisﬁes (EDS) and (BMPP). Let (N;v) be a convex game. By
(BMPP), X
i2Sm




 i(N;v) <v ( S
m) : (3)
Since all players in Sm receive the same payoff we have for all i 2 Sm
jS
mj i(N;v) <v ( S
m)=j S
mj a ( S
m;v):
Hence,
 i(N;v) <a ( S m;v) for all i 2 Sm:
This contradicts   satisfying (EDS). So, equation (3) does not hold true. Hence equation (2)
holds.
2
The property incorporated in equation (2) will be called max-efﬁciency (MEFF).
We have the following characterization.
4With aslightabuse of notationwe write(Sm [T;v)forthe restrictionof the game (N;v)to the set of players
Sm [ T. It is obvious that the restricted game is convex as well.
4Theorem 3.1 A solution   satisﬁes (EDS), (BMPP), and (HMMC) if and only if   = E.
Proof. First we show that E satisﬁes the properties. Since E assigns to every convex game a
coreelement, itsatisﬁes(EDS).Itfollowsfrom(1)thateveryplayerinS1 receivesthemaximum
payoff and that all other players receive less than this maximum. Since these players divide
v(S1) it follows that E satisﬁes (BMPP). Since E satisﬁes the reduced game property of Hart
and Mas-Colell [6] it satisﬁes (HMMC), a weaker variant of the reduced game property of Hart
and Mas-Colell [6].
Now suppose that a solution   satisﬁes the properties. We prove that   = E. By lemma3.1
it follows that   satisﬁes (MEFF). The proof will be by induction on the number of players.
Clearly, for convex games (N;v) with jNj =1we have that  (N;v)=v ( f 1 g )=E ( N;v)
by (MEFF). Suppose that for some p  2 we have  (N;v)=E ( N;v) for all convex games
(N;v) with jNjp−1 . We prove that  (N;v)=E ( N;v) also holds for all convex games
(N;v) with jNj = p.
Let (N;v)beaconvex gamewithjNj = p.L e tS 1bethelargestcoalitionthatmaximizesthe
average worth function a(;v). First we will show that a(S1;v)=a ( S m;v).S i n c e satisﬁes
(EDS) there exist i 2 S1 with  i(N;v)  a(S1;v). Then for all j 2 Sm we have
a(S
m;v)=  j( N;v)   i(N;v)  a(S1;v);
where the equality follows by deﬁnition of Sm and (MEFF). The ﬁrst inequality follows by
deﬁnition of Sm. Since the deﬁnition of S1 implies a(S1;v)a(Sm;v)we conclude
a(S
m;v)=a ( S 1;v): (4)
Again by deﬁnition of S1 this implies Sm  S1. We will show that Sm = S1.
We need the following lemma. The proof is relegated to appendix A.
Lemma 3.2 For all T  N nS m it holds that v−Sm(T)=v ( S m[T)−v ( S m) :
It follows from lemma 3.2 that the reduced game (NnSm;v−Sm
)is convex.





m)=v ( S 1)−v ( S
m) ;
where the equality follows since Sm  S1.B u tt h e n
v ( S 1 )
j S 1 j
=
v ( S 1 )−v ( S m )+v( S m)
j S 1n S mj+j S mj
=
v − S m( S 1n S m)+v( S m)
j S 1n S mj+j S mj
:
From this and (4) it follows that
a(S1;v)=
v ( S 1)
j S 1j
=
v − S m
( S 1n S m)
j S 1n S mj
: (5)
5Now, using the convexity of the reduced game (NnSm;v−Sm)it follows that
 i(NnSm;v−Sm
)=  i( N;v) <a ( S 1;v)=
v − S m
( S 1n S m)
j S 1n S mj
for all i 2 S1nSm; (6)
where the ﬁrst equality follows from (HMMC), the strict inequality from (4) and the deﬁnition
of Sm, and the second equality from (5). Inequality (6) contradicts with (EDS) of S1nSm in the
reduced game (NnSm;v−Sm
). Hence, the assumption Sm  S1 is false. Since Sm  S1, this
completes the proof of Sm = S1.
It remains to prove that indeed from Sm = S1 it follows that  (N;v)=E ( N;v). Note ﬁrst
that (MEFF), the deﬁnition of Sm,a n dS m=S 1yield
 i(N;v)=
v ( S m)
j S mj
=E i( N;v) for all i 2 S
m: (7)
Then, if Sm = N we are done. If Sm 6= N it holds that
 i(N;v)=  i( Nn S m;v−Sm
)=E i( Nn S m;v−Sm
)=E i( N;v) for all i 2 NnSm; (8)
where the ﬁrst equality follows from (HMMC), the second equality from the induction hypoth-
esis, and the third equality from Sm = S1. The theorem now follows from (8) and (7).
2
It follows from the following examples that the propertiess in theorem 3.1 are logically
independent.
 The solution that equally divides the worth of the grand coalition to the players satisﬁes
(HMMC) and (BMPP), but does not satisfy (EDS).
 Deﬁne the solution  by i(N;v): =m a x S 2 2 Nnf;g
v(S)
jSj for all i 2 N. The solution 
satisﬁes (EDS) and (HMMC). Obviously, it is does not satisfy (BMPP).















The solution  satisﬁes (EDS) and (BMPP), but not (HMMC).
A second characterization is obtained by (EDS), (BMPP), and (DMMC), which is a weaker
variant of the reduced game property of Davis and Maschler [5]. Formally, a solution   on C
satisﬁes
6 DM max-consistency (DMMC) if for all games (N;v) 2C , and all i 2 NnSm:
 i(N;v)=  i( Nn S m;v −Sm);





0 if T = ;;
v(N) −
P
i2Sm  i(N;v) if T = NnSm;
maxQSm fv(T [ Q) −
P
i2Q i(N;v)g if ;TNn S m.
Thus, our second characterization of the egalitarian solution is as follows.
Theorem 3.2 A solution   satisﬁes (EDS), (BMPP), and (DMMC) if and only if   = E.
Proof. Since E satisﬁes the reduced game property of Davis and Maschler [5] it follows that E
satisﬁes (DMMC), a weaker variant of the reduced game property of Davis and Maschler [5].
The proof is obtained from the proof of theorem 3.1 by replacing v−Sm by v−Sm and lemma 3.2
by
Lemma 3.3 For all T  N nS m it holds that v−Sm(T)=v ( S m[T)−v ( S m) :
The proof of lemma 3.3 can be found in appendix B.
2
It follows from the same examples above that the properties in theorem 3.2 are logically
independent.
4 The dual egalitarian solution
In this section, we will introduce a dual egalitarian solution on the class of concave games. It
turns out that for a given convex game the egalitarian allocation is equal to the dual egalitarian
allocation for its dual concave game. This result is in the vein of the duality result regarding
the core (see section 2). Similar results can easily be proved for the Shapley value [9], the
Prenucleolus [7], and the -value [10].
Let us start with the deﬁnition of the dual egalitarian solution E. In every step of the
algorithm a cooperative game is considered. The set of players in this game is the set of players
that have not received a payoff yet. The largest coalition with the lowest average worth is
selected and the players in this coalition receive this average worth.
Let (N;w) be a concave game. Deﬁne N1 := N and w1 := w.




i (N;w): =a ( T 1;w 1) for all i 2 T1:
7Step k: Suppose that T1;:::;T k−1 have been deﬁned recursively and T1 [[T k−1 6=N.
Deﬁne a new game with player set Nk := Nn(T1 [[T k−1). For all subcoalitions
T  Nk,d e ﬁ n ew k( T): =w k − 1( T k − 1[T)−w k − 1( T k − 1) . The game (Nk;w k)is concave
since (Nk−1;w k−1) is concave. Deﬁne Tk to be the largest coalition with the lowest
average worth in this game. Deﬁne
E

i (N;w): =a ( T k;w k) for all i 2 Tk:
The following lemma shows that concavity of the game (Nk;w k)ensures that there is a
largest coalition with the lowest average worth in the game (Nk;w k). The proof is skipped.
Lemma 4.1 For a concave game (N;w) the collection L(w) consisting of the empty set and
the coalitions with lowest average worth is a lattice. Hence, there is a unique largest coalition
with the lowest average worth.
Althoughinsectionweconsideredtheegalitariansolutionforconvexgamesonlyitisdeﬁned
on a larger set of games. However, the egalitarian solution does not exist for all TU-games.
Speciﬁcally, if the game is concave and not additive then the egalitarian solution does not exist.
Hence, the dual egalitarian solution is not simply the egalitarian solution for concave games,
since the dual egalitarian solution exists for all concave games.
Dutta and Ray [3] already noted that for the E-algorithm it holds that in every next step the
payoff given to an agent is strictly less. The following lemma describes a similar result for E.

































jTkj by deﬁnition of Tk and Tk \ Tk+1 = ;.
2
We now turn to the main result in this section. It can be formulated concisely as follows:
for every convex game (N;v) it holds that E(N;v)=E ( N;v). To prove this we need some
lemmas.
We start with lemma 4.3, which states that E(N;v) is an element of the dual core of
(N;v).
Lemma 4.3 For a convex game (N;v) it holds that E(N;v) 2 C(N;v).








( T 1) 8 i2T 1;


















Further, for all 1  k  q and all T 
Sq

































since by deﬁnition Tk minimizes this expression.














































Second, we prove the stability of E(N;v),i . e .
P
i 2 TE 
i( N;v)  v(T) for all T  N.






)=j K 1 j
v  ( T 1 )























































Here the ﬁrst inequality follows from (9), and the second inequality from the concavity of v.
This completes the proof of the lemma.
2
Note that since C(N;v)=C ( N;v)it follows by lemma 4.3 that E(N;v) 2 C(N;v).
Next we prove that E satisﬁes two welfare properties, namely it is the element of the core
withthehighest minimumandthelowest maximum payoffsamongall coreelements. Thesame
holds true for E.








E i( N;v); and
max





i 2 N E i( N;v):
Proof. We only give the proof for E; the proof for E is similar. Let T1;:::;T qbe the sets that
are subsequently generated by the E-algorithm. Let x 2 C(N;v).
Then,
min













where the last inequality follows from the fact that x 2 C(N;v)=C ( N;v), and the equality
from lemma 4.2. This proves the ﬁrst part.





v ( T q)
j T qj








where the equality follows from lemma 4.2 and the ﬁrst inequality from x 2 C(N;v). This
proves the second part.
2
To prove the main result in this section we need one lemma more.
Lemma 4.4 Let (N;v) be a convex game. Let S1;:::;S p and T1;:::;T q be the sets that are
subsequently generated by the E-algorithm and the E-algorithm, respectively.
Then Sp  T1. Additionally it holds that Ei(N;v)=E 
i( N;v) for all players i 2 Sp.
Proof. From proposition 4.1 it follows that for all i 2 Sp and all j 2 T1 we have that
v(N) − v(NnSp)
jSpj
= Ei(N;v)= m a x
x 2 C ( N;v)
min




v ( N)−v ( Nn T 1)
j T 1j
:
Then by lemma 4.1 it follows that Sp  T1.
2
The following theorem is the third main theorem of this paper.
Theorem 4.1 Let (N;v) be a convex game. Then, E(N;v)=E ( N;v).
Proof. Let S1;:::;S p and T1;:::;T q be the sets that are subsequently generated by the E-
algorithm and the E-algorithm, respectively. We call these sets the E-sets and the E-sets,
respectively. The proof is by induction on the number p of E-sets.
Suppose (N;v) is a convex game with p =1 . Then Sp = S1 = N. B yl e m m a4 . 4i t
immediately follows that Ei(N;v)=E 
i( N;v) for all players i 2 N.
10Now suppose that for some p  2 it holds that E(N;v)=E ( N;v) for all convex games
(N;v) with at most p − 1 E-sets. We prove that E(N;v)=E ( N;v) for all convex games
(N;v) with exactly pE-sets. So, let (N;v) be a convex game with pE-sets.
Again, by lemma 4.4, Ei(N;v)=E 
i( N;v) for all players i 2 Sp. It remains to prove that
Ei(N;v)=E 
i( N;v) for all players i 2 NnSp. Now, note that
Ei(N;v)=E i( Nn S p;v)=E

i( Nn S p;( v j Nn S p)
)for all i 2 NnSp: (10)
Here,theﬁrstequalitycanbereadilyveriﬁed,andthesecond equalityfollowsfromtheinduction






i( N;v) for all i 2 NnSp: (11)
First, we will prove that Sp = T1. By lemma 4.4 Sp  T1. Suppose Sp  T1.F r o m t h e















Using this, we can prove that the following two assertions hold true.
(i)





for all S  NnSp;S6 =; ;
(ii) If S 6 T1nSp; then






We prove that (i) holds true ((ii) can be proved similarly). Suppose that (i) is not true. Hence,
there is a set S  NnSp, S 6= ; with






By (12), (13), and (14) it follows that






By (15) and again (12) we have
v(N)− v(Nn(S [ Sp))
jS [ Spj
=









11This is a contradiction with the deﬁnition of T1. So, (i) holds true.
From (i) and (ii) we conclude that T1nSp is the ﬁrst E-set when we apply the E-algorithm





v ( N n S p ) − v ( N n T 1 )
j T 1 n S p j
=
v ( N ) − v ( N n T 1 )
j T 1 j
; (16)












Here the ﬁrst equality follows from the induction hypothesis, the inequality follows from the
deﬁnition of Sp, and the second equality follows from (12).
We see that (16) and (17) give a contradiction. Hence, Sp = T1.
The algorithm for E implies that equation (11) holds true. Combining (10) and (11) yields
Ei(N;v)=E 
i( N;v) for all i 2 NnSp;
completing the proof.
2
12Appendix A Proof of lemma 3.2
Let T  NnSm. We ﬁrst show that
X
i2Sm
 i(Sm [ T;v)=v( S m) : (18)
If T = NnSm, then (18) holds by (MEFF). From now on assume T  NnSm.
Suppose there is a player i 2 Sm [ T such that
 i(S











m [ T;v)=v( T
m) : (21)
Now,
a(T m;v)=  j( S m[T;v)>a ( S m;v)  j(N;v) for all j 2 T m (22)
Thestrictinequalityfollowsfrom(19),theequalityfrom(20)and(21),andthesecondinequality
from the deﬁnition of Sm and (MEFF). Equation (22) contradicts (EDS) of T m in the game
(N;v). Hence, there is no player i 2 Sm [ T such that  i(Sm [ T;v)>a ( S m;v). Hence,
 j(S
m [ T;v)a(S
m;v) for all j 2 S
m [ T: (23)





From the induction hypothesis it follows that
Ej(S
m [ T;v)=  j( S
m[T;v) for all j 2 S
m [ T: (25)
From (24) and (25) one deduces (18).






This completes the proof of the lemma.
2
13Appendix B Proof of lemma 3.3
Let T  NnSm. We prove
v−Sm(T)=v ( S m[T)−v ( S m) : (27)




If T = NnSm, then by (MEFF) and the deﬁnition of the reduced game
v−Sm(T)=v ( N ) −
X
i 2 S m
  i ( N;v)
= v(Sm [T)−v(Sm):
It remains to consider T with ;TNn S m.L e tQS m. Note that
X
i2Q
 i(N;v)=j Q j a ( S m;v)=j Q j a ( S 1;v)j Q j a ( Q;v)=v( Q ) : (29)
Here, the ﬁrst equality follows from Q  Sm, the second equality from equation (4), and the
inequality from the deﬁnition of S1. Then,
v(Q [ T) −
X
i2Q




where the ﬁrst inequality follows from (29) and the second inequality from the convexity of v.
We conclude that (27) holds true.
2
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